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Abstract— A key challenge in multi-robot and multi-agent
systems is generating solutions that are robust to other self-
interested or even adversarial parties who actively try to
prevent the agents from achieving their goals. The practicality
of existing works addressing this challenge is limited to only
small-scale synchronous decision-making scenarios or a single
agent planning its best response against a single adversary
with fixed, procedurally characterized strategies. In contrast
this paper considers a more realistic class of problems where
a team of asynchronous agents with limited observation and
communication capabilities need to compete against multiple
strategic adversaries with changing strategies. This problem
necessitates agents that can coordinate to detect changes in
adversary strategies and plan the best response accordingly.
Our approach first optimizes a set of stratagems that represent
these best responses. These optimized stratagems are then inte-
grated into a unified policy that can detect and respond when
the adversaries change their strategies. The near-optimality of
the proposed framework is established theoretically as well as
demonstrated empirically in simulation and hardware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-robot systems is a widely studied field, but the
research is typically focused on a single team of cooperative,
or self-interested, robots [1]–[3]. In contrast, many real-world
domains consist of a team of robots that must complete
tasks while competing against other adversarial robots. For
instance, consider a team of UAVs tasked with surveying
a scene or locating a secret base as well as an opposing
team of UAVs tasked with preventing the secret base from
being found. These adversarial scenarios require reasoning
about not only completing the tasks designated to the team,
but also considering what the adversarial robots may do to
prevent their completion. In this paper, we study the general
multi-robot decision-making problem with uncertainty in
outcomes, sensors and communication, while incorporating
multiple adversarial robots into this problem. Communi-
cation uncertainty and limitations further necessitates the
design of decentralized agents that can coordinate with their
teammates while anticipating changes in the adversary strate-
gies using only their partial views of the world. This is for the
first time all these forms of uncertainty as well as adversarial
behavior have been considered in the same decision-theoretic
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planning framework1. Furthermore, the size of the spaces for
possible set of actions and coordination strategies for both the
teammates and adversaries scale exponentially in the number
of agents [6] and are typically much too large for an agent
to reason about directly. Hence, a successful agent usually
requires some form of high-level abstraction to reduce its
effective planning space [7]–[9].
One approach is therefore to create a set of basic
stratagems, which are best-responses to particular forms of
adversarial behavior. The reasoning problem is then reduced
to choosing among these basic stratagems in a given situa-
tion, thus significantly improving the scalability of planning.
This approach can be achieved by anticipating in advance
a small set of high-level tactics from which the adversaries
can choose in any situations, that capture the diversity of
their intentions. The task of the high-level planner then is
to choose a response to the adversaries’ current tactics and
follow it until it is determined that they have changed their
tactics and a new response is needed. This fits particularly
well in asynchronous robotic planning scenarios: since each
stratagem has different execution time, agent decision mak-
ing is no longer synchronized as assumed in existing non-
cooperative multi-agent frameworks [6], [10], [11].
The main contribution of this paper therefore focuses
on the design of such a high-level planner, which can be
decoupled into two separate tasks. The first task involves
generating a set of basic stratagems for a team of decentral-
ized agents, each of which is optimized to work best against
a particular tactic of the adversaries. This is formulated as
a set of Macro-Action Decentralized Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (MacDec-POMDPs) [9], [12]
that each characterize a cooperative scenario where a team
of decentralized agents collaborate to maximize the team’s
expected performance while operating in a stationary envi-
ronment simulated by a single tactic of the adversaries (Sec-
tion III). The stratagems can therefore be acquired by solving
for a set of probabilistic policy controllers that maximize
the expected total reward generated by the corresponding
MacDec-POMDPs. Then, the second task is to integrate
these specialized policy controllers into a unified policy
controller that works best on average against the adversaries’
switching tactics. This again can be achieved by optimizing
the unified controller with respect to a series of MacDec-
POMDPs (Section IV) so that it can detect situation changes
and switch opportunistically between these stratagems to
1Previous works [4], [5] in the literature addressing this challenge
have mostly focused on reactive frameworks or do not consider multiple
adversarial robots into their frameworks.
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respond effectively to the adversaries’ new tactical choice.
Interestingly, it can be shown that under a certain mild
assumption, the result of this stratagem integration/fusion
scheme appears to be near optimal with high probability
as shown in Section V. Finally, to empirically demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed framework, experiments
conducted for a robotic scenarios are presented in Section VI,
which show consistent results with our theoretical analysis.
II. BACKGROUND AND NOTATIONS
This section provides a short overview of MacDec-
POMDPs [9], [12] for decentralized multi-agent
decision-making under uncertainty. Formally, a MacDec-
POMDP is defined as a Dec-POMDP [13], [14] tuple
(I,S,{Ai}ni=1,{Oi}ni=1T,Z,R,γ,b) augmented with a
finite set of macro-actions, Mi, for each agent, i, with
M , M1 ∪ . . .∪Mn denote the set of joint macro-actions.
Each macro-action is defined as a tuple mi = (βmi , Imi ,ρmi)
where βmi : S → {0,1} and Imi ∈ Si are sets of rules
that decide, respectively, the termination and eligibility
to initiate of the corresponding macro-action mi, while
ρmi : Θi → Ai denotes a low-level policy that maps agent
i’s local histories θi ∈ Θi to primitive actions ai ∈ Ai.
Each agent will follow a chosen macro-action mi until its
termination condition βmi is met. Its stream of observations
collected during the execution of mi is jointly defined as a
macro-observation ηi. As such, each individual high-level
policy pii : ζi→ mi of agent i can then be characterized as a
mapping from its history of macro-actions and -observations
ζi , {(mit−1,η it )}t≥1 to the next macro-action. Planning in
Dec-POMDP therefore involves maximizing the following
total expected reward with respect to the joint high-level
policy pi = (pi1,pi2, . . . ,pin):
pi∗ = argmax
pi
E
[
+∞
∑
t=0
γ tR(st ,at)|b,M,pi
]
(1)
Unlike Dec-POMDP’s, the MacDec-POMDP formalism
is naturally suitable for asynchronous multi-robot planning
scenarios since it is not necessary for the macro-actions
mi = (βmi , Imi ,ρmi) to share the same execution time. In fact,
from the perspective of an individual agent, the outcome of
its selected macro-action (e.g., when it terminates) is non-
deterministic as its termination rule may depend on the global
state of the environment as well as the movements of the
other parties, which are not observable to the agent. This
makes optimizing pi via (1) using traditional model-based dy-
namic programming techniques [9], [15]–[20] possible only
if the probability distribution over the stochastic outcome
of βmi , e.g., p(βmi(s) = 0 | s), is explicitly characterized.
This is not trivial and does not scale well in complex
decision problems with long planning horizon, vast state
and action spaces. Alternatively, to sidestep this difficulty,
it is also possible to parameterize and optimize pi directly
via interaction with a black-box simulator2 that implicitly
2In many real-world scenarios, it is often easier to hand-code a simulator
that captures the interaction rules between agents than learning probability
models of their outcomes.
encodes the probabilistic models of transition T, observation
Z, reward R and termination rule βmi [8]. This interestingly
allows us to avoid modeling these probabilistic models
directly and improve the scalability of solving MacDec-
POMDPs. The specifics of this model-free approach are
detailed in Section III which serves as the building block of
our adversarial multi-agent planning paradigm in Section IV.
III. GENERATING BASIC STRATAGEMS
This section assumes we have access to a set of black-
box simulators preset by the domain expert to simulate
accurately the adversaries’ basic tactics, upon which more
advanced strategies might be built. For example, in popular
real-time strategy (RTS) games, a player can often anticipate
in advance a small set of effective basic tactics from which
the other competitors might choose in any situations. The
decision making process of a player therefore comprises
two parts. The first part focuses on formulating fundamental
stratagems to counter the anticipated tactics of the adver-
saries and is addressed in the remaining of this section. The
second part then is to integrate the resulting stratagems into
a unified strategy that can detect changes in the adversaries’
tactical choice and switch opportunistically between them in
response to those changes (see Section IV).
In particular, formulating a stratagem to counter a specific
tactic of the adversaries can be posed as solving a MacDec-
POMDP which characterizes a cooperative scenario where a
team of decentralized agents collaborate to maximize their
total expected reward while operating in an artificial envi-
ronment driven by the corresponding tactic simulator. The
stratagem can then be optimized via simulation as detailed
next. Formally, we represent a stratagem of a team of agents
as a set of decentralized finite-state-automata (FSA) policy
controllers, C s = {C sk }nk=1, each of which characterizes a
single agent’s corresponding part of the stratagem, C sk . Each
individual controller C sk has p nodes {qik}pi=1 and there are
two probabilistic functions associated with each node qik:
(a) an output function λ (m jk|qik) , λ ki j which decides the
probability λ ki j that macro-action m
j
k ∈ Mk is selected by
agent k; and (b) a transition function δ (qtk|qik,m jk) , δ ki j(t)
which determines the probability to transit from qik to q
t
k
following the execution of the selected macro-action m jk.
The weights w, {{λ ki j},{δ ki j(t)}} can then be optimized via
simulation using the graph-based direct cross-entropy (G-
DICE) optimization method described in [8] (see Figure 1).
In essence, G-DICE iteratively samples w from a distribu-
tion q(w;θ) parameterized by θ and simulates the induced
policy (with respect to w) with the opponent’s tactic E s ,
{E sk }nk=1 using its black-box simulator to acquire a perfor-
mance estimate L(C s(w),E s). At each iteration, a subset of
samples with top performance estimates is used to update θ
via maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). This process has
been demonstrated empirically in [21] to converge towards
a uniform distribution over optimal values of w. In practice,
this optimization paradigm is very well-fitted to multi-robot
planning scenarios since it allows us to bypass the explicit
q q0Cs1
Cs2 q q0
G-DICE
L(Cs(w), Es)
w
 ✓
w ⇠ q(w; )✓
{Es1 , Es2}
simulator
Fig. 1: A team of two collaborative agents is represented by
two decentralized controllers C s , {C s1 ,C s2} characterizing their
stratagem against a basic tactic E s , {E s1 ,E s2 } of the adversaries.
The sampling distribution of C s’s parametric weights w is then op-
timized using performance feedback L(C s(w),E s) from interacting
with E s’s black-box simulator.
probabilistic modeling of opponent’s tactic which is usually
fraught with the curses of dimensionality and histories,
especially in complex problem domains with large number of
agents, vast action and observation spaces [8]. This method
will also serve as the building block for our stratagem fusion
scheme detailed in Section IV below.
IV. STRATEGEM FUSION
This section introduces the stratagem fusion scheme that
integrates all basic stratagems (see Section III) into a set of
unified policies for a team of agents to collaborate effectively
against the adversaries’ high-level switching policies that
switch opportunistically among a set of basic tactics. The
task of stratagem fusion is then to formulate a high-level
policy that can automatically detect situation changes and
choose which response to follow at any point of decision
to adapt effectively to new situations (e.g., the adversaries
decide to switch to a different tactic) and consequently, maxi-
mize its expected performance. To achieve this, we model the
team’s high-level policy as a set of unified controllers, each
of which characterizes a single agent’s high-level individual
policy that results from connecting its low-level controllers
via inter-controller transitions (see Figure 2). This essentially
allows the agents to change their strategic choices during
real-time execution by transiting between different nodes
of different controllers. The weights associated with these
transitions therefore regulate the switching decision of the
high-level controller and need to be optimized. If we know
exactly how the adversaries change their tactics (i.e., their
black-box simulators) in response to our strategic choices,
these weights can be optimized using the same approach
described in Section III (see Figure 2b).
In practice, however, the adversaries’ switching
mechanism is often unknown or highly non-trivial to
characterize, especially in decentralized settings where their
strategic choices are largely influenced by their limited
observation and communication capacities, which are also
unknown. Existing works [6], [10], [22], [23] that attempt to
reason explicitly about the adversaries’ strategic rationalities
are therefore impractical and less robust in situations where
irrational choices arise due to limited cognitive abilities
q q0
q q0
w
C11
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C1 : w ⇠ q(w; )✓
G-DICE
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{C1(w), C2(w)} E(u)
C(w)L( , E(u))
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) An agent’s unified controller C1(w) that connects its
low-level controllers (i.e., stratagems) {C 11 ,C 21 } via inter-controller
transitions (i.e., denote by the red, dash lines) whose weights w are
to be optimized; and (b) a team of two agents optimizes their high-
level joint controller {C1(w),C2(w)} via interaction with the black-
box simulator of the adversaries’ switching strategy E (u) given the
switching weights u.
and lack of communication. This motivates us to consider
a more reasonable approach to formulate a robust policy
that works well on average when tested against all possible
high-level strategies of the adversaries. To achieve this,
the adversaries’ switching policies are similarly modeled
as high-level controllers that connect low-level controllers
representing their basic tactics using inter-controller
transitions as illustrated in Figure 2a. The weights of
these inter-controller transitions (that regulate switching
decisions) are then treated as random variables distributed
by a known distribution. Thus, instead of optimizing our
agents’ switching weights with respect to a single realization
of the adversaries’ inter-controller transitions, we optimize
them with respect to the distribution of these switching
weights to embrace their uncertainty.
Formally, let C = {Ck}nk=1 and E = {Ek}nk=1 denote the
sets of high-level controllers for the teams of collabora-
tive agents and adversaries, respectively, where Ck = {C sk }s
(Ek = {E sk }s) denotes a single agent’s (adversary’s) individ-
ual switching policy. Let w = {wk}nk=1 and pi(u) denote
the weights associated with inter-controller transitions of
C = {Ck}nk=1 and the distribution over random weights
u = {uk}nk=1 that regulates the switching decision of E =
{Ek}nk=1, respectively. Our approach proposes to optimize w
such that the expected performance of the induced high-level
controller C (w) when tested against a random adversary
E (u) distributed by pi(u) is maximized:
w∗ = argmax
w
(
L(w) , Eu∼pi(u)
[
L(C (w),E (u))
])
, (2)
where L(C (w),E (u)) denotes the simulated performance of
C (w) against E (u). However, since we can only access the
value of L(C (w),E (u)) via simulation, solving (2) requires
simulating C (w) against infinitely many candidates of E (u)
and is therefore intractable. To sidestep this intractability, we
instead exploit the following surrogate objective function,
ŵ = argmax
w
(
L̂(w) , 1
m
m
∑
i=1
L
(
C (w),E (u(i))
))
, (3)
where {u(i)}mi=1 are i.i.d samples drawn from pi(u). Intu-
itively, these are the potential candidates for the adversaries’
switching weights that can be identified in advance using
the domain expert’s knowledge. We can now solve (3) using
G-DICE [8] (see Section III) with a meta black-box that
aggregates the feedback of each black-box E (u(i)).
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section derives performance guarantees for the above
stratagem fusion scheme (Section IV) which depend on
the solution quality of the graph-based direct cross-entropy
(G-DICE) optimization method described in [8]. To enable
the analysis, we put forward the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Let L̂(w) denote an arbitrary black-box
function being optimized via simulation with G-DICE using
(3). Let U , {w | L̂(w) = maxw′ L̂(w′)} denotes the set of
optimal solutions to (3). Then, let p(w) and q(w;θ) denote
the uniform distribution over U and the sampling distribution
of G-DICE parameterized by θ (see Section III). For any
δ ∈ (0,1), there exists a non-decreasing sequence {εn,δ}∞n=1
for which:
Pr
(
DKL
(
q(w;θ ∗)‖p(w)
)
≤ εn,δ
)
≥ 1−δ ,
where n and θ ∗ denote the size of w and the optimal
parameterization of q(w;θ) found by G-DICE, respectively.
This is a reasonable assumption to make since it has been
previously demonstrated that the underlying cross-entropy
optimization process of G-DICE empirically causes q(w;θ)
to converge towards the uniform distribution p(w) over
optimal values of w [8], [21]. Then, let L(q) , Ew[L(w)]
(with L(w) defined in (2)) denote the expected performance
of C (w) when w is drawn randomly from q(w;θ ∗), we
are interested in the gap between L(q) and L(w∗) (see
Eq (2)), the latter of which is the best performance that
can be achieved. Thus, this gap essentially characterizes the
near-optimality of q(w;θ ∗), which are bounded below. To
do this, we first establish the following results in Lemmas
1 and 2 that bound the difference between the generalized
performance of q (i.e., L(q)) and its empirical version (i.e.,
the average performance L̂(q) when tested against a finite
set of adversary candidates). Lemma 3 is then established
to bridge the gap between the L̂(q) and L(w∗). The main
result that bounds the performance gap between L(q) and
L(w∗) is then derived in Theorem 1 as a direct consequence
of the previous Lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any sampling distribution q(w;θ), let L̂(q),
Ew
[
L̂(w)
]
, with L̂(w) defined in (3), denotes the empirical
performance of C (w) where w is randomly drawn from
q(w;θ). Then, it follows that with probability at least 1−δ
over the choice of candidates {u(i)}mi=1 for the adversaries’
switching weights,
L(q) ≤ L̂(q)+
(
DKL (q(w;θ)‖p(w))+ log 4mδ
2m−1
) 1
2
(4)
holds universally for all possible q(w;θ) where p(w)
denotes the uniform distribution over the set U of optimal
choice of w for (3), i.e., U, {w | L̂(w) = maxw′ L̂(w′)}.
Exploiting the result of Lemma 1, we can further derive
a tighter and domain specific bound on the difference
between the generalized and empirical performance of our
stratagem fusion scheme (see Section IV) that incorporates
the empirical optimality of G-DICE (see Assumption 1):
Lemma 2. Let q , q(w;θ ∗) denotes the optimal sampling
distribution found by G-DICE [8]. Let r denotes the number
of stratagems of each agent (Section III) and let k denotes
the number of nodes in each agent’s individual specialized
controller C sk . It then follows that with probability at least
1−δ ,
L(q) ≤ L̂(q) +
εh, δ2 + log 8mδ
2m−1
 12 , (5)
where L(q) and L̂(q) are defined in Lemma 1,
h = O
(
nr(r−1)k2) and δ ∈ (0,1).
Lemmas 1 and 2 thus bound the performance gap between
L(q) and L̂(q). To relate L(q) to L(w∗), we need to bound
the gap between L̂(q) and L(w∗), which is detailed below.
Lemma 3. Let q , q(w;θ ∗) denotes the optimal sampling
distribution found by G-DICE [8] and δ ∈ (0,1), then with
probability at least 1−δ ,
L̂(q) ≤ L(w∗) +
(
log 1δ
2m
) 1
2
, (6)
where L̂(q) is defined in Lemma 1.
Using these results, the key result can be stated and proven:
Theorem 1. Let q , q(w;θ ∗) denotes the optimal sampling
distribution found by G-DICE [8] and w∗ denotes the optimal
solution to (2). L(w∗) thus represents the best possible
performance and with probability at least 1−δ ,
L(q) ≤ L(w∗) + 2
εh, δ4 + log 16mδ
2m−1
 12 , (7)
where L(q) is defined in Lemma 1, h = O
(
nr(r−1)k2).
Due to the limited space, all proofs of the above re-
sults are deferred to the appendix of the extended ver-
sion of this paper at https://www.dropbox.com/s/
ao7onnpq52t3ar3/icra18.pdf?dl=0.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents an adversarial, multi-robot Capture-
The-Flag (CTF) domain adapted from its original domain in
[4] to demonstrate the effectiveness of our stratagem fusion
framework in Section IV. The specific domain setup for our
CTF variant is detailed in Section VI-A below.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Figures of (a) Capture-The-Flag (CTF) domain setup; and (b) hardware configuration of the experimented robots: each robot is built
from the Kobuki base of the TurtleBot 2 with on-board processing unit (Gigabyte Aero 14 laptop with Intel Core i7-7700HQ quad-core
CPU and NVIDIA GTX 1060 GPU with 6GB RAM) as well as sensory devices including (1) Intel RealSense Camera (R200) Developer
Kit (130mm x 20mm x 7mm) with Depth/IR: Up to 640×480 resolution at 60 FPS & RGB: 1080p at 30 FPS; and (2) Omnidirectional
RPLIDAR A2 with 4000 samples/s (10Hz) and 8/16m range.
A. Capture-The-Flag Domain
The domain settings for Capture-The-Flag are shown in
Fig. 3a, which depicts a competitive scenario between two
teams of decentralized, collaborative robots. Each team has
2−3 robots and the two teams divide the environment into
two parts separated by a horizontal boundary (the cyan line
in Fig. 3a), each of which belongs to one team (e.g., red
& blue). There are 10 vantage points within each team’s
territory. One of which contains the flag of the team (e.g.,
the red and blue circles in Fig .3a denote the locations of
the flags for the red and blue team, respectively). Each
team, however, only knows the location of its own flag,
thus making observations necessary to correctly detect
the enemy’s flag. The rule of the game is for each team
to defend its own flag while seeking to capture the flag
of the opposing team without getting caught. The game
ends when one team successfully captures the flag of the
opposing team. To achieve this, each team of agents need to
coordinate their movements between vantage points to reach
the opposing team’s flag and at the same time, avoid being
seen by opposing agents. If an agent engages an opposing
agent on foreign territory, its team will be charged with
a penalty. The particular macro-actions and -observations
available for each robot are detailed below, which feature
a wide range of interesting observations and patterns of
collaborative attack and defend for the opposing robots:
Macro-Actions. There are 4 classes of macro-actions
available to each robot at any decision time: (a) Move(p)
which invokes a collision avoidance navigation procedure
that directs the robot to vantage point p from its current
location; (b) Sentry(p1, p2, p3) which directs the robot
to vantage point p1 and then lets it stay in a closed-loop
moving from p1 to p2 to p3 and back to p1. There are 5
predefined instances for each team; (c) Pincer(p1, p2, p3, p4)
which directs the robot to vantage point pi (with i being its
role index in the team) and then p4. This creates an effective
pincer attack when 2 or 3 robots choose the same Pincer
instance. There are 3 different Pincer macros predefined for
each team; and (d) Tag which allows a robot to catch an
opposing robot on its own territory provided the opposing
robot is within a predefined tagging range.
Macro-Observations. There are in total 128 macro-
observations for each robot, which are generated by first
collecting raw observations the environment using the
robot’s on-board visual recognition/detection modules and
then summarizing the raw information into a 6-dimensional
observation vector. Each observation is represented as a
6-dimensional binary vector whose components correspond
to yes/no (1/0) answers to the following questions: (a) Is the
robot residing in its own or the opposition territory? (b) does
the enemy flag appear in sight? (c) is there an opposition
robot in close proximity? (d) is there an opposition robot
further away? (e) is there an allied robot in the vicinity? and
(f) is there an observed pincer signal emitted from allied
robots? The answers to these questions can be generated
from the raw visual processing unit on-board each robot.
Rewards. Finally, in order to encourage each team to
discover and capture the opposition’s flag as soon as
possible while avoid getting tagged, a reward mechanism
is implemented which issues (a) a negative reward of −1
to each robot at each time step; (b) a positive reward of 10
to a team if one of its member successfully tags an enemy;
(c) a negative reward of −10 for the entire team if one of
the team member gets caught; and (d) a large award of
500 is issued to a team when it successfully captures the
opposition’s flag. Conversely, this implies a large penalty of
−500 issued to the other team who loses the flag.
Black-box Simulators. In addition to the domain specifi-
cation above, the allied robots also have access to a set of
black-box simulators of the opposition’s fundamental tactics
upon which more advanced strategies might be built. In our
experiments, these are constructed as tuples of individual
hand-coded tactics (see Table I below) that include: (a) DL
and DR which script the robot to play defensively on left and
right flank of its territory using Sentry and Move macro-
actions, respectively; (b) DC which scripts the robot to play
defensively on the middle-front of the allied territory; (c)
TABLE I: The opposition’s team tactics E s represented as combi-
nations of individual’s tactics {E sk }k of 3 robots R1,R2 and R3.
R1
({E s1 }4s=1) R2 ({E s2 }4s=1) R3 ({E s3 }4s=1)
E 1 , (E 11 ,E 12 ,E 13 ) E 11 , DL E 12 , DC E 13 , DR
E 2 , (E 21 ,E 22 ,E 23 ) E 21 , DL E 22 , AS E 23 , DR
E 3 , (E 31 ,E 32 ,E 33 ) E 31 , AA E 32 , DC E 33 , AS
E 4 , (E 41 ,E 42 ,E 43 ) E 41 , AS E 42 , AA E 43 , AS
AS which leads the robot to a vantage point inside the
opposition’s territory to get an observation. Depending on
the collected observation, the robot either moves to another
vantage point or launch a pincer attack to a vantage point
estimated to contain the opposition’s flag; and (d) AA which
is similar to AS except that it enables the robot to retreat
to a safe place within the allied territory to gather extra
observations if it observes that there is an opposing robot
in close proximity. The team of allied robots however do not
have access to these details and can only interact with them
via a black-box interface that gives feedback on how well
their strategies fare against the opposition’s.
B. Experiment: Generating Basic Stratagems
To learn the fundamental stratagems to counter the opposi-
tion’s basic tactics as described in Section VI-A, we construct
separate MacDec-POMDPs (see Section II) that encapsulates
the opposition’s corresponding tactic simulator E s , {E sk }k.
The corresponding stratagem can then be formulated and
computed as decentralized FSA controllers C s , {C sk }k
(Section III) that optimizes these MacDec-POMDPs. This
is achieved via a recently developed graph-based direct
cross-entropy (G-DICE) stochastic optimization method of
[8]. Fig 4 shows that the empirical performance of each
stratagem C s when tested against the corresponding opposi-
tion’s tactic E s increases and converges rapidly to the optimal
performance when we increase the number of optimization
iterations. Table II then reports the averaged performance
(with standard errors) of each stratagem when tested against
all other opposition’s tactics over 1000 independent simula-
tions. The results interestingly show that the quality of each
stratagem C s decreases significantly when tested against
other opposition’s tactics {E s′}s′ 6=s that it was not optimized
to interact with (see Table II’s first 4 rows and columns).
This implies a performance risk when applying a single
stratagem against non-stationary opponent with switching
tactics: The applied stratagem might no longer be optimal
when the opponent switches to a new tactic. This necessitates
design of agents which can detect and respond aptly when
the opponents change their tactics which constitutes the main
contribution of our work (Section IV). Its effectiveness is
demonstrated next in Section VI-C.
C. Experiment: Stratagem Fusion
This section empirically demonstrates the effectiveness
of our stratagem fusion framework (Section IV) against
more sophisticated and non-stationary/strategic opponents. In
particular, we first evaluate the performance of the optimized
stratagems in the previous experiments (Section VI-B)
against a team of opponents with switching tactic: each
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Fig. 4: Graphs of each stratagem’s increasing performance qual-
ity in the no. of optimization iterations when optimized against
the opposition’s corresponding tactic of (a) (DL,DC,DR), (b)
(DL,AS,DR), (c) (AA,DC,AS) and (d) (AS,AA,AS) (see Ta-
ble I). The shaded area represents the confidence interval of the
average performance.
opponent independently switches its tactic based on a
set of probability weights u (as previously described in
Section IV). The results (averaged over 1000 independent
runs) are reported in the last columns of Table II, which show
significant decreases in the performance of each stratagem
when tested against an opponent that keeps switching
between tactics. This corroborates our observations earlier
that a single stratagem is generally ineffective against
opponents with unexpected behaviors. This can be remedied
using our stratagem fusion scheme (see Fig. 2) to integrate
all single stratagems into a unified (switching) policy which
can perform effectively against the switching tactic of the
opponents (assuming the switching weights u are known).
The reported results in the last row of Table II in fact
show that among all policies, the optimized switching
policy performs best against the tactic-switching opponents
and near-optimal against each stationary opponent: Its
performance is, in most cases, only second (and very close)
to the corresponding stratagem specifically designed to
counter the opponent’s tactic.
In practice, however, since the switching weights of the
opponents are usually not known a priori, a similar problem
arises when the actual weights u used by the opposition’s
switching tactic are different from those used to optimize
the switching policy of the allied robots. To resolve this,
our stratagem fusion scheme further treated the switching
weights u of the opposition as random variables whose
samples are either given in advance or can be drawn di-
rectly from a blackbox distribution pi(u). A good-for-all
switching policy C (ŵ) can thus be computed using our
sampling method in Section IV (specifically, see Eq. (3))
TABLE II: Average performance (with standard errors) of the robots’ basic stratagems C 1,C 2,C 3,C 4 and switching policy C (w) when
tested against the opposition’s basic tactics E 1,E 2,E 3,E 4 (see Table I) and switching tactic E (u) with switching weights u. The switching
policy C (w) is learned assuming access to a blackbox simulator of E (u) (see Section III).
E 1 = (DL,DC,DR) E 2 = (DL,AS,DR) E 3 = (AA,DC,AS) E 4 = (AS,AA,AS) E (u)
C 1 481.235±0.119 405.737±0.933 184.081±1.453 126.665±1.277 329.598±1.137
C 2 450.004±1.217 439.339±0.699 191.609±1.279 97.129±1.392 295.037±1.302
C 3 296.436±2.616 139.034±1.573 374.477±1.049 190.408±1.285 263.993±1.343
C 4 323.481±2.463 218.717±1.432 352.924±0.924 375.485±0.893 309.696±1.229
C (w) 469.007±0.774 399.731±0.949 332.819±1.006 301.353±1.095 386.831±0.992
TABLE III: Average performance (with standard errors) of the allied robots’ good-for-one C (w) (optimized against a particular E (u))
and good-for-all C (ŵ) (optimized against the entire distribution of u – see Section IV) switching policies when tested against unseen
switching policies E (u(1)),E (u(2)), . . . ,E (u(6)) of the opposition.
E (u(1)) E (u(2)) E (u(3)) E (u(4)) E (u(5)) E (u(6))
C (w) 383.836±1.006 385.482±0.892 388.875±0.875 388.361±0.876 389.545±0.871 389.824±0.869
C (ŵ) 385.811±1.013 390.403±0.882 393.296±0.865 391.793±0.870 394.021±0.861 391.698±0.873
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Fig. 5: Graphs of the switching policy’s increasing performance
in the no. of optimization iterations when optimized against a
switching tactic of the opposition with (a) fixed switching weights;
and (b) random switching weights. The shaded area represents the
confidence interval surrounding the average performance.
which is guaranteed, with high probability, to produce near-
optimal performance against unseen switching weights of
the opposition. This is empirically demonstrated in Table III
which shows the superior performance of the good-for-
all policy C (ŵ) to that of the good-for-one policy C (w)
when tested against opponents with unseen tactic-switching
weights E (u(1)),E (u(2)), . . . ,E (u(6)). Also, similar to the
case of basic stratagem in Section III, the quality of those
switching policies increases and converges rapidly to the
optimal value when we increase the number of optimization
iterations (Fig. 5) in our stratagem fusion framework, which
demonstrates the its stability.
VII. HARDWARE EXPERIMENTS
In addition to the simulated experiments, we also conduct
real-time experiments with real robots to showcase the ro-
bustness of our proposed framework in practical RTS sce-
narios. The specifics of our robot configuration and domain
setup are shown in Fig. 3. Each robot is built with the
Kobuki base of TurtleBot 2 and configured with on-board
processing unit (Gigabyte Aero 14 laptop with Intel Core
i7-7700HQ quad-core CPU and NVIDIA GTX 1060 GPU
with 6GB RAM) as well as sensory devices including (1)
Intel RealSense Camera (R200) Developer Kit (130mm x
20mm x 7mm) with Depth/IR: Up to 640×480 resolution at
60 FPS & RGB: 1080p at 30 FPS; and (2) Omnidirectional
RPLIDAR A2 (4000 samples/sec (10Hz) and 8/16m range).
The information provided by the LIDAR sensor is directed
to each robot’s on-board collision-avoidance navigation pro-
cedure [24] to helps it localize and move around without
colliding with other robots and obstacles in the environment.
The visual feed from RealSense camera is passed through the
Single Shot MultiBox Detector [25] implemented on each
allied robot’s processing unit to detect its surrounding objects
(e.g., the opposing robots, other allied robots and flags). The
processed information is then used to generate the high-level
macro-observations (Section VI-A) for the robot’s on-board
policy controller. Fig. 6 shows a visual excerpt from our
video demo featuring a CTF scenario of 3 allied robots which
implement the optimized policy produced by our framework
to compete against an opposing team of 2 adversary robots
implementing the hand-coded tactics in Section VI-A. The
excerpt shows interesting teamwork between all allied robots
in capturing the opposing team’s flag despite their partial,
decentralized views of the world (see detailed narration in
Fig. 6’s caption), which further demonstrates the robustness
of our proposed framework in practical robotic applications.
Interested readers are referred to our attached video demo
for a complete visual demonstration.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a novel near-optimal adversarial pol-
icy switching algorithm for decentralized, non-cooperative
multi-agent systems. Unlike the existing works in literature
which are mostly limited to simple decision-making sce-
narios where a single agent plans its best response against
an adversary whose strategy is specified a priori under
reasonable assumptions, we investigate instead a class of
multi-agent scenarios where multiple robots need to operate
independently in collaboration with their teammates to act
effectively against adversaries with changing strategies. To
achieve this, we first optimize a set of basic stratagems that
each is tuned to respond optimally to a pre-identified basic
tactic of the adversaries. The stratagems are then integrated
into a unified policy which performs near-optimally against
any high-level strategies of the adversaries that switches
B1 B3B2
R1 R2
B1 B3
B2
R1 R2
B1
B3
B2
R1 R2
(a) (b) (c)
B3
B2
B1
R1
R2
B1
B3
B2R1 R2
B1
B3
B2R1
R2
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 6: Image excerpts from a video demo showing (1) a team of 3 allied (blue) robots (B1,B2 and B3) that implement the optimized
stratagem produced by our framework (Section III) to compete against (2) an opposing team of 2 opponent (red) robots (R1 and R2)
which implement the hand-coded tactics DL and DR (see Section VI-A), respectively: (a) B1,B2 and B3 decide to invade the opposition
territory; (b) B1 and B3 decide to attack the center while B2 decides to take the left flank of the opposition; (c) B2 passes through R1’s
defense while B1 takes an interesting position to block R2 so that B3 can pass through its defense; (d) B1 and B2 detect the flag and
mount a pincer attack; (e) R2 arrives to defend the flag and B2 retreats to avoid getting tagged; and (f) without noticing B1 from behind,
R2 continues its DR patrol, thus losing the flag to B1.
between their basic tactics. The near-optimality of our pro-
posed framework can be established in both theoretical and
empirical settings with interesting and consistent results. We
believe this is a significant step towards bridging the gap
between theory and practice in multi-agent research.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1.
The result of Lemma 1 follows directly from the classical
PAC-Bayes result [26] in learning theory. This is achieved
by setting up an artificial learning task where L(w) ((2))
corresponds to the expected loss of a hypothesis candidate
w when evaluated against a random test input u∼ pi(u) and
similarly, L̂(w) ((3)) denotes the average performance of
w on a training set of sampled tests {u(i)}mi=1 drawn i.i.d
from pi(u). The sampling distribution q(w;θ) can then be
treated as a stochastic predictor that samples a hypothesis to
evaluate a given test input. Its empirical and generalized loss
thus corresponds to L(q) and L̂(q), respectively. Finally,
pretending that p(w) is the prior over the hypothesis space
of w, the gap between L(q) and L̂(q) can therefore be
bounded with high probability using (4), which is the exact
statement of the PAC-Bayes bound for stochastic predictors
in [26].
Proof of Lemma 2.
By Lemma 1, with probability at least 1−δ/2,
L(q) ≤ L̂(q)+
(
DKL (q(w;θ ∗)‖p(w))+ log 8mδ
2m−1
) 1
2
(8)
On the other hand, by Assumption 1, we also know that
DKL (q(w;θ ∗)‖p(w)) ≤ εh,δ/2 (9)
where h is the size of w, which contains the weights
associated with the inter-controller transitions in the agents’
high-level controllers. Since each agent has r low-level
controllers (corresponding to its r stratagems) and there
are k nodes in each controller, there will be r(r − 1)k2
inter-controller transitions within each agent’s high-level
controller. Thus, in total, a set of high-level controllers
for n agent has nr(r− 1)k2 inter-controller transitions. The
number h of weights associated with those transitions are
therefore O(nr(r − 1)k2). Finally, plugging (9) into (8)
yields (5). Since (8) and (9) hold with probability at least
1− δ/2 each, (5) holds with probability at least 1− δ by
the union bound.
Proof of Lemma 3.
By definition, we have L̂(q)≤ L̂(p) = L̂(ŵ). Then, note that
E[L̂(ŵ)] = L(ŵ) due to the definitions in (2) and (3). As
such, by Hoeffding inequality, it follows that with probability
at least 1− exp(−2mε2),
L̂(q) ≤ L̂(ŵ) ≤ L(ŵ) + ε ≤ L(w∗) + ε , (10)
where the third inequality follows directly from the definition
of w∗. Thus, with probability at least 1 − exp(−2mε2),
L̂(ŵ) ≤ L(w∗) + ε . Setting δ = exp(−2mε2) and solving
for ε yields ε = (log(1/δ )/2m)1/2. Substituting this into
Eq. (10) yields (6).
Proof of Theorem 1.
Applying Lemma 2 with δ/2 yields
L(q) ≤ L̂(q) +
εh, δ4 + log 16mδ
2m−1
 12 . (11)
Likewise, applying Lemma 3 with δ/2 yields
L̂(q) ≤ L(w∗) +
(
log 2δ
2m
) 1
2
,
≤ L(w∗) +
εh, δ4 + log 16mδ
2m−1
 12 . (12)
Substituting (12) into (11) yields (7). Since (11) and (12)
hold with probability at least 1 − δ/2 each, (7) holds
with probability at least 1− δ by the union bound. This
result thus guarantees the near-optimality of our stratagem
integration scheme with high probability.
Remark. Both the PAC-Bayes result of [26] and Hoeffding
inequality in Lemma 3 implicitly assume the loss function
is always bounded between 0 and 1. This is however not a
hindrance to our analysis since MacDEC-POMDP’s intrinsic
reward function can always be re-scaled to meet that require-
ment without affecting the solution quality.
